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Comment  Paul Schreyer
Introduction
The topic of banking output has long been a thorny issue for national 
accountants and analysts of banking performance and productivity. Chris-
tina Wang, Susantu Basu, and John Fernald (see chapter 7 of this volume; 
Paul Schreyer is head of the National Accounts Division of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development.A General Equilibrium Approach to the Measurement of Bank Output    3 2 1
WBF in what follows) provide us with an explicit model of the behavior of 
households, ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, and nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, with a view to draw-
ing conclusions for the measurement of implicitly priced output of banks. 
Such a model is useful, because it spells out the assumptions underlying the 
statements about measurement, making them transparent and focusing the 
discussion. The WBF contribution is also timely, because the topic of bank-
ing output has attracted renewed attention at the national and international 
level in the past two or three years: in Europe, member countries of the Euro-
pean Union agreed on a common method and timeline for the treatment 
of ﬁ  nancial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM) in their 
respective national accounts (Commission of the European Communities 
2002); the United States recently introduced a revised treatment of FISIM 
into their National Income and Product Accounts (Fixler, Reinsdorf, and 
Smith 2003; NIPAs); and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) discussed the topic in the context of a Task Force 
on the Measurement of the Production of Financial Institutions (Schreyer 
and Stauﬀer 2003). This was complemented by other contributions, such
as those of Triplett and Bosworth (2004), who also discuss the measure-
ment of banking output and make several proposals to advance the matter. 
It is against this background—new developments in the international debate 
and existing prescriptions in the System of National Accounts (SNA)—that 
I will discuss WBF’s contribution.
A Point to Reemphasize: Financial Institutions Provide Financial Services
An important feature of WBF’s model and its conclusions for measure-
ment is the focus on the actual ﬂ  ow of ﬁ  nancial services provided by banks. 
More speciﬁ  cally, in WBF’s model, banks provide ﬁ  nancial services in the 
form of screening and monitoring to mitigate asymmetric information 
problems between potential investors and those seeking funds. This diﬀers 
from a strand of research (e.g., Ruggles 1983) that sees banks as providers 
of ﬁ  nance1 (to borrowers) and consequently recommends that the output 
of banks be measured by the ﬂ  ow of revenues from providing ﬁ  nancing 
services—note the subtle but important diﬀerence between ﬁ  nancing and 
ﬁ  nancial services.
The emphasis of WBF on ﬁ  nancial services as the output of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions is a point worth reiterating. According to WBF, banks exist 
and create value essentially because there are information asymmetries that 
make it costly for households and investors with surpluses of funds to lend 
directly to nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms with requirements for funds. There is in fact a 
signiﬁ  cant body of literature that has considered information asymmetries 
as an explanation for the existence and activity of banks, as documented, 
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for example, in a survey by Gorton and Winton (2002). However, the step 
from acknowledging this reason for the existence of ﬁ  nancial institutions 
to bringing out the implications for the measurement of output is much 
scarcer, and this eﬀort is an important merit of WBF’s chapter. A similar 
conclusion—to put forward ﬁ  nancial services as the output of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions—has been reached by the OECD Task Force on Financial Ser-
vices Measurement (Schreyer and Stauﬀer 2003), albeit in the context of a 
much simpler accounting model.
Wang, Basu, and Fernald limit their focus to screening and monitoring 
services. Other services could easily be put forward—in particular, conve-
nience services (say, for depositors—for example, safeguarding, automatic 
payments, and provision of checks). This makes little diﬀerence to their 
qualitative conclusions, however. And WBF’s limitation to screening and 
monitoring services reﬂ  ects the trade- oﬀ between providing an explicit mod-
eling approach for important services and keeping the model tractable.
Should the Reference Rate Reﬂ  ect Risk?
One of the central conclusions put forward by WBF is that the reference 
rate for measuring nominal bank lending services “must be risk adjusted 
(i.e., contain a risk premium reﬂ  ecting the systematic risk associated with 
the loans)” (see chapter 7 of this volume). This is in contrast to current prac-
tice in the U.S. NIPAs, where the reference rate is an (implicitly) maturity-
  weighted rate of government bonds and thus a default-  free rate. Similarly, 
the directives for the implementation of the new FISIM measures in the 
European Union require that countries use an interbank rate; that is, an 
interest rate that is short-  term but also essentially risk free. The choice of 
the right reference rate is important, because it inﬂ  uences the measured 
level of banking output and potentially inﬂ  uences gross domestic product, 
as well as its growth rates. Some more discussion is required to shed light 
on this point.
The Question behind the Reference Rate: Who Bears Risk?
The ﬁ  rst point to make is that it is not the reference rate as such that is at 
stake; it is the more general question about whether banks assume risk. Con-
sider an investment decision by a bank, say, in a loan. In an eﬃcient market, 
the value of this ﬁ  nancial asset to the bank at the beginning of a year (PL) 
will equal the discounted value of expected interest payments at the end of 
the year (RL) and the discounted market value of the loan at the end of the 
year (P1
L), minus the value of ﬁ  nancial services (SL) that the bank provides 
to the borrower, where these services are implicitly priced2 and assumed to 
be provided at the beginning of the year.
2. We ignore explicitly priced services, because they add nothing to the present debate and 
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The appropriate rate for discounting should be the required return that an 
investment of equal risk and maturity is expected to yield on the ﬁ  nancial 
market. This is also the deﬁ  nition of a risk-  adjusted opportunity cost for 
the bank’s investment. Call this required rate of return rH, following WBF’s 
notation. We can further decompose this required rate into a risk-  free rate 
and a risk premium: (1   rH)   (1   rF)(1   rp), where rF is a risk-  free rate 
and rp is the risk premium. An asset market equilibrium should then be 
characterized by the following condition:
(C1)  PL   
1
 
1   rF   SL.
After inserting (1   rH)   (1   rF)(1   rp) and after a few transformations, 
equation (C1) becomes:
(C2) (1    rp)(1   sL)   
1
 
1   rF





where sL  SL/  PL is the value of ﬁ  nancial services implicitly provided per 
dollar of the value of the asset, and rL  RL/  PL is the rate of return that re-
ﬂ  ects the regular (interest) payments on the asset (loan).
The left-  hand side of equation (C2) is the discount factor that combines 
the risk premium and the rate of implicitly priced services. Let us call this 
combined rate s ˜L, where (1   s ˜L)  (1   rp)(1   sL). If one inserts this rela-
tion into equation (C2), one gets
(C3)  s ˜L   
1
 
1   rF




PL   1   
1
 
1   rF(rL       rF),
where the rate of price change P1
L/  PL –   1 has been labeled  . For simplic-
ity, we shall assume that the loan is not traded and the price change is zero. 
Thus,
(C4)  s ˜L   
1
 
1   rF(rL   rF).
Equation (C4) corresponds to the simplest form of the user cost price that 
features in the NIPAs calculation of FISIM.3 What then does one make of 
all this in relation to the WBF critique of the reference rate?
User cost prices of loans, as in equation (C4), reﬂ  ect implicitly priced 
services to borrowers and risk premia. By construction, the reference rate rF 
is a risk-  free rate; otherwise, the user cost price would not comprise a risk 
premium. But there is no claim that the risk-  free rate constitutes the risk-
  adjusted required return on investments for ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms—the latter was 
assumed to be rH, and this rate correctly entered as the discount factor in 
3. The national accounts measure does not comprise the factor 1/  (1   rF), but this is of 
secondary importance and depends only on the assumptions about the timing of interest pay-
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the equilibrium condition in equation (C1). In equation (C4), the reference 
rate serves simply as a device to capture the risk premium with a view to 
reﬂ  ecting risk-  assumption services provided by the bank to the borrower. 
Thus, it is not the required return to the ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm that is at issue in the 
discussion about the reference rate. By challenging the risk-  free reference 
rate, WBF challenge the existence of this service: it is not the bank but is its 
shareholders who ultimately bear systematic risk, and consequently, mea-
sured bank output is overstated. The real question therefore, is, whether 
there is a risk-  assumption service by the ﬁ  nancial institution.
Scope of Assets and Liabilities
The discussion so far has been in terms of a loan in isolation, and state-
ments about the right measure of banking output have to consider both the 
asset and liability side of the bank’s balance sheet. And while the source of 
a bank’s funds (equity, deposits, bonds issued, etc.) is without importance in 
WBF’s model, it is not without importance in a national accounts context. 
In essence, WBF state that the systematic risk of loans is borne by the bank’s 
shareholders and not by the bank itself—hence, the risk- assumption service 
should not be identiﬁ  ed as part of bank output. Indeed, if one brings in 
shareholder considerations and computes the user cost price of the bank’s 
shares from the perspective of shareholders, a computation parallel to the 
preceding one can be applied to yield
(C5)  s ˜SI   
1
 
1   rF(dSI    SI   rF).
In equation (C5), s ˜SI is the user cost price for the bank’s shareholders, 
dSI are dividends paid by the bank,  SI are expected holding gains, and rF, 
as before, is a risk-  free rate. As in WBF, take the simple case, where a bank 
is only funded by equity and only invests in loans, and where the value of 
equity equals the value of loans, which we shall call yL. Then, correcting the 
user cost price on loans in equation (C4) by the user cost price of sharehold-
ers’ investment in equation (C5), we get
(C6) (s ˜L   s ˜SI)yL   
 
[rL   (dSI    SI)]yL.
In equation (C6), the rate of return on loans rL is compared with the 
expected rate of return on the bank’s equity (dSI    SI), which in equilibrium 
would equal the bank’s opportunity cost rH. But if (dSI    SI)   rH, one ends 
up with a value for bank output that corresponds to WBF’s formula with a 
risk-  adjusted reference rate rH, rather than the risk-  free rate rF.
Thus, the two approaches would yield the same result if the national 
accounts corrected for shareholders’ user costs, as speciﬁ  ed in equation (C5). 
However, the national accounts do not perform this correction, as by con-
vention, no user costs are computed on equity. There is thus an underlying 
issue of scope—which ﬁ  nancial instruments are carriers of ﬁ  nancial ser-A General Equilibrium Approach to the Measurement of Bank Output    3 2 5
vices—that needs addressing in the national accounts. In its narrowest form, 
implemented, for example, in the European Union, the national accounts 
measure of ﬁ  nancial services is solely based on deposits and loans. The U.S. 
NIPAs takes a wider perspective and considers all assets and liabilities that 
earn interest or imputed interest. Obviously, the broader the scope of assets 
and liabilities that the national accounts take into account, the smaller the 
diﬀerence to the WBF results, even if the national accounts employ a risk-
  free reference rate.
A diﬀerent way of interpreting WBF’s results vis-  à-  vis the national 
accounts is to say that the national accounts implicitly take a perspective 
where a ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rm and its owners constitute one economic entity. Wang, 
Basu, and Fernald’s model sees banks separately from their shareholders, 
and by implication, any risk premia charged by banks are passed on to 
shareholders, who bear the systematic risk of investment. The authors con-
clude that banking output as presently measured is overstated by the risk 
premium, because ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms should be considered diﬀerent entities 
from their shareholders.
A Practical Point: Choosing the Required 
Rate of Return for Shareholders
If one accepts WBF’s suggestion to use a risk-  adjusted reference rate 
and/ or to correct the national accounts computation for user costs to share-
holders, the practical question arises: how do we choose the appropriate 
risk- adjusted rate that reﬂ  ects the required return to shareholders? As shown 
in WBF’s model, the theoretically correct rate is determined by the repre-
sentative consumers’ expected consumption path, or more speciﬁ  cally, the 
required rate equals the risk-  free rate, plus a risk premium that depends on 
the covariance between the consumer’s intertemporal pricing kernel and the 
assets in which the bank invests.
The empirical implementation of this risk- adjusted rate is a diﬃcult issue. 
Typically, the covariance between asset returns and consumption is weak—a 
ﬁ  nding that is well established in the literature on the equity premium puzzle 
(see Kocherlakota [1996] for an overview). A weak covariance implies a small 
adjustment to the risk- free rate, however, and would diminish the empirical 
impact of the choice. For example, using the components of the Federal 
Reserve System monetary aggregates, Barnett, Liu, and Jensen (1997) found 
that risk adjustments were small. Of course, such empirical considerations 
have no bearing on the theoretical points made by WBF, but they are of 
interest to statistical agencies that have to implement measures.
Is the Test of “The Bank That Does Nothing” a Valid One?
One test proposed by WBF to substantiate the plausibility of their model 
is to ask what their measure of production would be for a bank that “does 
nothing” (see chapter 7 of this volume). More speciﬁ  cally, a hypothetical 
situation is invoked, where banks are simple accounting devices, only there 326    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
to receive households’ capital (they buy the bank’s shares) and to lend out 
these funds to entrepreneurs, but not to provide screening or monitoring 
services—shareholders themselves see right through the bank and are able 
to screen borrowers and to monitor them. Then, WBF argue, the measure 
of this bank’s output should be zero. The national accounts measure, un-
der the same circumstances, produces a positive value of output, because 
in the previous notation, it would correspond to the user costs of the loans, 
(rL –   rF)yL, and they are positive if there is systematic risk.
This raises again the question about the source of ﬁ  nancing. In WBF’s 
model, the Modigliani-  Miller theorem applies to banks as well as to nonﬁ  -
nancial ﬁ  rms; therefore, banks’ ﬁ  nancing structures are of no consequence 
for the required rate of return. Consequently, allowing for debt ﬁ  nancing of 
banks makes no diﬀerence to WBF’s argument that national accounts over-
state banking output by the risk premium on loans and other assets. This 
is correct if one accepts the assumptions underlying the Modigliani-  Miller 
theorem (perfect capital markets, equal access, homogenous expectations, 
etc.), which we shall do for the present argument. Thus, the structure of bank 
ﬁ  nancing has no inﬂ  uence on the bank’s required rates of return. However, 
the structure of ﬁ  nancing does make a diﬀerence when applying the test 
of the bank that does nothing, because diﬀerent sources of ﬁ  nancing are 
not treated symmetrically in the national accounts. Take a bank that does 
nothing—a pure accounting device in WBF’s terms—but assume that it is 
deposit ﬁ  nanced, not equity ﬁ  nanced. Applying national accounts method-
ology to this case yields a zero measure of production.
This is easily demonstrated by considering the national accounts’ FISIM 
calculation, where yD and rD are the value of deposits and the interest rate 
paid on them, respectively:
National accounts’ banking output   yL(rL   rF)   yD(rD   rF).
In WBF’s case of a bank that does nothing, there are no implicitly priced 
depositor services, and the rate that is paid on deposits must equal the loan 
rate, itself equal to the return required by the ﬁ  nancing units, the depositors: 
rL   rD. In the absence of equity ﬁ  nancing and in the equilibrium situation 
postulated by WBF, yL   yD and the banking output measured by the na-
tional accounts equals zero. This makes the relevance of the test of the bank 
that does nothing dependent on an empirical issue: national accounts fail to 
register zero output, to the extent that bank loans are equity ﬁ  nanced—in 
the more realistic case of deposit-  ﬁ  nanced banks, the argument applies to 
a much smaller extent.
Timing of Provision and Measurement of Financial Services
Wang, Basu, and Fernald’s model assumes that screening services are 
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borrowers, and the authors rightly point out that there is an issue of timing 
when the ﬂ  ow of services is measured via ﬂ  ows of interest that are observed 
during the life of the loan. This is not a contentious issue, and the accrual 
principle, one of the cornerstones of the SNA, suggests that eﬀorts be made 
to enter payments for a service at a time as close as possible to the provision 
of the service. The tricky empirical issue of implementing this principle in 
the context of a ﬂ  ow of service payments that cannot be directly observed 
remains!
Another Point Worth Emphasizing: Holding Gains
The authors rightly observe, “If interest income is often employed as 
implicit compensation for ﬁ  nancial services provided without explicit charge, 
then in principle, capital gains can be used in place of interest for the same 
purpose” (see chapter 7 of this volume). To illustrate, WBF use the example 
of a loan that is sold oﬀ and argue that only expected capital gains should 
enter the computation of ﬁ  nancial services output, whereas capital gains or 
losses purely due to the random realization of asset returns should not be 
counted as ﬁ  nancial output.
This is an important observation that lines up with a suggestion made 
by Fixler and Moulton (2001) and the discussion in Schreyer and Stauﬀer 
(2003). At the same time, any consideration of holding gains or losses in 
measures of production turns out to be highly controversial in the context 
of national accounts, because the SNA does not consider holding gains to 
be production. But the basic issue remains: there are many items on a bank’s 
balance sheets with remunerations other than interest payments, and if an 
argument can be made that ﬁ  nancial services are somehow associated with 
these assets and liabilities, expected holding gains cannot be ignored. Thus, 
WBF have raised another important and valid point here.
Conclusions
There are many advantages to having an explicit model when devising pro-
posals for measurement, and WFB should be commended for that. Explicit 
statements of assumptions and behavior of economic agents and the use of 
a model to bring things together are most valuable to make informed choices 
about measurement.
A core issue that arises from the discussion and that probably deserves 
further research is the role of risk and the question of whether, from an 
accounting perspective, banks or their shareholders bear the risk involved 
in lending.
Generally, WBF’s model is relevant, raises the right issues, and treats 
them in a rigorous way: (a) we should view banks as institutions that pro-
vide ﬁ  nancial services and then should be clear about what these services 328    J.  Christina Wang, Susanto Basu, and John G. Fernald
are and how they should be measured; (b) the choice of the reference rate is 
important, and its theoretical foundations need to be clearly put down; (c) 
measuring service ﬂ  ows at the time when they are produced and consumed 
can be diﬃcult; (d) expected holding gains are an integral part of the return 
of certain ﬁ  nancial instruments and should not be ignored in measuring 
ﬁ  nancial services; and (e) interest rates are not normally the appropriate 
measures of ﬁ  nancial service prices.
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